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Some of us remember the TV show, “Meeting of Minds,” in which Steve Allen interviewed 
historical figures. When possible, the actors used the actual words that had been written by 
the figures. One could imagine Allen asking John Dewey to be interviewed, but rather than 
having him simply say what he had already had written, Allen pressed him to discuss what 
had gone wrong with modern philosophy by employing a cultural interpretation of its 
historical development, urging him not so much to take a radical break from this previous 
work but to try to make sense of his views from an special perspective and to give further 
insight into his naturalizing philosophy. An extended conversation might have produced this 
recently published book by Dewey. 
 
John Dewey died in 1952, having a book manuscript that he thought had been left in a taxi; 
however, it recently was found in the Dewey Papers at Southern Illinois University 
Carbondale. The manuscript was written, with one exception, between the summer of 1941 
and late 1942. In a wonderful job of editing, Phillip Deen worked with the manuscript; 
because it was not a finished, Deen moved some material around to make the book more 
coherent, although the basic chapters remain from the manuscript. The book title and most 
of the chapter titles are Dewey’s; Deen gives an excellent Introduction. 
 
Dewey set out to write a social history of philosophy. The first part of the book aims to give 
an overview of the development of philosophy from the Greeks, showing both that 
philosophy retained assumptions from previous eras, and also that the movements in 
philosophy were affected by contemporaneous social influences. In the second half of the 
book, Dewey gives his own account of what a truly modern philosophy would look like. 
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There is no radical discontinuity in Dewey’s thinking in this book from his previously 
published works, but Dewey not only offers a deeper argument about the history of 
philosophy but also makes further progress in his mature thinking about a naturalized theory 
of knowledge. 
 
“Theoretical reflection arises in a social medium,” (15) Dewey writes. Beginning his 
argument that philosophy is influenced both by one’s culture and the tendency to retain ill-
suited beliefs from previous ages, Dewey contends that modern philosophy still retains 
baggage from the Roman-Hellenistic and Medieval traditions. In particular, the idea of a 
dynamic center of awareness that is separate from nature—the idea of an atomic self and 
introspective psychology—requires a certain social organization, not yet attained in ancient 
religions, but perhaps began as early in Europe with the advent of Christianity. Since one 
“casts his imaginations in material drawn from tradition and from the peculiar context of his 
day and place,” (15) as well as carries the baggage of former traditions, philosophy can 
understand these forces and adopt an appropriate method if it is cognizant of these 
influences and follows scientific methods. His assumption, of course, is that the science 
gives us the appropriate method to deal with issues in a naturalistic way, but the former 
traditions have prevented naturalistic methodology from being adopted in modern and 
contemporary philosophy. 
 
Dewey begins his cultural analysis in Chapter two by discussing the Greeks, whose great 
intellectual triumph was to conceive of nature, not in the sense of modern matter, Dewey 
says, but via a naturalistic story of the transformation of elements. It was nature in the sense 
of “the original and abiding force” (25). Dewey points out that there was no discussion of 
consciousness or of subject and object but rather simply of nature, with reason being 
responsible for the order of things. As Greek society progressed, so did the development of 
the arts and reflection on the arts (medicine, drama, etc.), which, in turn, developed two 
customs, the agrarian and the mechanical. These two streams continued in philosophy with 
the emphasis on things growing and nature as vital on the one hand, and nature as 
mechanical on the other hand. Since the agrarian tradition is older, Dewey asserts that it was 
natural for the philosophical tradition to find a home in that tradition, in which the ideas of 
social prestige and justice by nature were found. Dewey ends this chapter in a stirring 
rejection of the modern view that philosophers come to the world as a blank tablet, with no 
human interests and out of time, and conceive of the universe objectively. Rather, “The 
philosopher is first and last a human being with his own intellectual and emotional habits 
who is involved in concrete scene having its own color of tradition; its own occupations and 
dominant desires; its own overhanging problems and preferred ways of meeting them. His 
intellectual response is a function of these two variables.” (33). 
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Chapter 3 tells the story of rational discourse. Once having stepped outside of the daily 
activities to conceive of nature, Plato continued this idea and proposed a reality beyond the 
version of nature as had been conceived up to that time. In Plato’s vision, logic “was 
elevated to a metaphysics,” (41), uniting with a cosmology to create a metaphysics that has 
influenced Western philosophy until today. Even if the Platonic turn was wrong, as Dewey 
believed, nevertheless European philosophy followed this path where a corrupt world could 
only be tamed by a supernatural realm of disciplined reason (with special revelation taking 
the place of reason within Christianity). Add to this view the Aristotelian position that 
knowledge was isolated from practice and the superiority of contemplation, and you have a 
position in which nature was forced to fit into a framework of discourse, with Greek logic 
corresponding to Greek discourse. 
 
The Medieval search for salvation marks the next philosophical turn for Dewey. A logical 
precondition for salvation was the introduction of subjectivism, an individual who could be 
saved by faith. The Skeptic, Epicurean and Stoic schools provided the foundation for this 
turn, with the separation of the moral from the political and the legal, as well as the internal 
from the external. These Greek and Roman philosophies influenced Christianity and 
through the institution of the Church continued to exert influence on Western culture 
through doctrine, exerting imaginative and emotional appeal on Western culture. On the one 
hand, an internal subject with the faculty of will was developed, along with, on the other 
hand, the beginnings of a notion of nature that was no longer clothed in human and moral 
traits. 
 
The move Dewey makes in Chapter 5 is a pivotal one in his explaining how modern 
philosophy got off track. His argument is that the progress of science proved the human 
capability for moving knowledge forward, especially juxtaposed to what the old institutions 
of the medieval period produced, and thus those institutions and their magnification of 
cosmic power were viewed as the foe to be defeated if progress was to continue. To counter 
such power, the new sense of human power became enshrined in the metaphysical principle 
of the individual, a self-sufficient source of truth. Rather than the sovereignty of the cosmic, 
the new science proposed the sovereignty of the individual, the self, the ego, which could be 
set over against the polluting influence of the old institutions. What was essentially a social 
statement became a metaphysical doctrine. The notion of cosmic nature from the Greeks 
was transferred to the notion of human nature, which was no longer part of the cosmos of 
the ancients. “The result was a subjectivism and individualism of philosophical theory and 
of ethics, politics, and economics” (72). Natural rights and natural law were transferred 
from cosmic nature to human nature. The resulting individual was “a manifestation of the 
changes that were taking place in socio-cultural conditions” (72). The more the Aristotelian 
based world view in which the human was intimately a part of nature was replaced, the 
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more explicit became the emphasis on human nature as the seat of the faculties of mind, and 
the issue of how and what to know was changed into the question of whether knowledge of 
the external world was possible at all, which, Dewey says, is the modern Problem of 
Knowledge. With time, these views became articles of popular belief that affect today not 
only what and how we study but even what we perceive: over time, such “chains” become 
so natural “that they are not even felt” (257). Thus, the modern social problem for 
philosophy is to become aware of the habits and established dogmas that institutionalize the 
dualisms of subject and object and reject them so that our knowledge can become 
appropriately naturalized. 
 
Dewey asserts that if it had not been for the intervention of supernaturalism, the new 
science might have been able to employ the psychology of Aristotle, in which human 
knowing was part of the process of nature, to develop the kind of naturalistic method of 
knowing that Dewey approves. But, given the new Problem of Knowledge, focus was 
placed on what one could know of the external world, developing such notions as sense-
data—and today creating we is referred to as the Hard Problem in the Philosophy of Mind—
issues which are the results of modern philosophy taking the wrong turn.   
 
This modern approach to knowledge with a focus on certainty is vastly different from the 
actual practice of experimental science, but the power of tradition blinds us to this 
discontinuity, something Dewey thinks we must overcome to advance knowledge. Even 
those who disavow belief in the supernatural nevertheless are caught in this tradition that is 
dependent on medieval supernaturalism. I take it that Dewey is saying that the problem is 
not that modern materialism has abandoned one side of Cartesian dualism but that the whole 
dualistic system should be abandoned, a system that is a result of medieval supernaturalism 
and the Renaissance belief in the power of humans, which in turn created the metaphysical 
system of Descartes and the Problem of Knowledge. In Dewey’s view, the problem of 
knowledge should be concerned with “knowledging (as in ac-knowledging) concrete cases 
with all methodologies available, realizing that knowledgeing is an ongoing process that is 
self-reflective and self-correcting, an approach found in the sciences. We live in a natural 
world (as distinct from a material world—that concept is a part of the legacy of subject and 
object), and the methods should be naturalistic. 
 
I have focused most of this review on the first part of Dewey’s book because it illustrates 
his cultural history of philosophy (as opposed, he says, to a traditional history of 
philosophy), an approach he describes with insight and focus that is not found previously in 
Dewey’s work. The second part of the book attempts to give an account of what a truly 
modern (as distinct from the present unmodern) philosophy would look like, a naturalized 
view of knowing. The surviving manuscript is more incomplete in this stage of the book, 
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and thus we find only a partial proscriptive reinterpretation. Further, since a more 
functional, naturalized approach can be understood not only by looking at science but by 
examining the present state of philosophy, Dewey returns to many of the arguments found 
in the first part of the book, albeit in the service of illuminating inadequate concepts such as 
persons, minds, sensations, and knowledge, among others.  
 
Take for instance the notion of a personal self, which traditionally has been interpreted as an 
individual subject. Personal factors, Dewey argues, are social in origin and operation. It 
would be strange to try to describe a friend to someone without mention any description of 
bodily characteristics, for instance, and yet philosophers (in Dewey’s time, at least) continue 
to think of selves as purely subjective and of emotions as purely internal. Persons are those 
entities that we see in action, and it is only a false turn in thinking that has led us to 
differentiate persons from things and misuse the concept. (As an example, and on this point 
Dewey is prescient, he discusses the Supreme Court’s limited ruling that a corporation is a 
person, a decision Dewey says was enacted for the interest of finance-capitalism (188).) 
 
Philosophers have had a tendency to convert adjectives into nouns, to interpret interactions 
(or transactions) as metaphysical objects; we talk about” persons” rather than “personal,” 
“minds” rather than “mental,” “reason” rather than “rational,” and “sensations” rather than 
“sensing,” and all of these nouns are thought to be descriptive of the individual subject. 
However, Dewey argues, these are not the highest faculties of individual subjects but they 
describe certain organic and environmental interactions. Life, Dewey says, is a constant 
transaction between organic structures and environmental conditions. Knowing becomes a 
mode of technology in which metaphysical dualistic distinctions fall away. In fact, he 
recommends replacing the notion of pragmatic “instrumentalism,” which he has emphasized 
before, with the notion of “technology,” although he realizes that this term may also face the 
same misunderstanding and criticism. Humans and environment are both part of the same 
nature, and knowing is simply the process of meeting obstructions, formulating specific 
problems, making theories, meeting and trying to resolve the problem.   
 
Reacting to the accusation that his views are too focused on the practical, Dewey spends a 
chapter discussing the distinction between the practical and the intellectual and calls into 
question the radical distinction, saying that it is based more on history and the preferences 
of social class. In fact, scientific knowledge is always pressing forward. In typical fashion, 
Dewey says, “conclusions reached are capital to be invested not beds upon which to repose” 
(279). Likewise, the distinction between the material and the ideal are not metaphysical 
notions but a reflection of social differences, with those in the esteemed class concerning 
themselves with the ideal. The difference between the two concepts is merely functional in 
the process of knowing, not differences in entities.  The split exists, but as a society we are 
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better off when we do not denigrate the material or practical but accept both activities as 
useful. The job of philosophers, Dewey reminds us, should be to engage in clearing up the 
conceptual mess that modernity encapsulates, a mess that philosophers are largely 
responsible for, and generally to make clear the assumptions that are encapsulated in our 
inquiry and are so lasting and common that they are taken for granted. 
 
